000			03891 a2200373 4500
001			200128642
999			_c200128642 _d16262
003			TR-AnTOB
005			20230525211859.0
008			130703s2012 nyu 001 0
020			_a0195309081 (pbk. : alk. paper)
020			_a9780195309089 (pbk. : alk. paper)
020			_a019530909X (alk. paper)
020			_a9780195309096 (alk. paper)
035			_a(OCoLC)ocn690904563
040			_aDLC _cDLC _dYDX _dYDXCP _dBWX _dCDX _dOBE _dUKMGB _dUPM _dDLC
041			_aeng
050	0	0	_aJF1001 _b.C24 2012
090			_aJF1001 .C24 2012
100	1		_aCasella, Alessandra _986960
245	1	0	_aStorable votes : _bprotecting the minority voice / _cAlessandra Casella.
264		1	_aNew York : _bOxford University Press, _cc2012.
300			_axxxiii, 346 p. : _bill. ; _c24 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 333-337) and index.
505	0		_aMachine generated contents note: pt. 1 The Idea -- 1.The Simple Logic of Storable Votes -- 1.1.The Theory -- 1.2.The Experiment -- 1.3.Conclusions -- 2.Storing Votes over Time -- 2.1.The Theory -- 2.2.The Experiment -- 2.3.The Results -- 2.4.Conclusions -- 3.Protecting Minorities without Sacrificing Efficiency -- 3.1.The Theory -- 3.2.The Experiment -- 3.3.The Results -- 3.4.Conclusions -- 4.Agenda Control -- 4.1.Controlling the Order of the Agenda -- 4.2.Controlling the Content of the Agenda -- 4.3.Conclusions -- 5.Storable Votes in Large Elections -- 5.1.The Theory -- 5.2.Symmetric Scenarios -- 5.3.Asymmetric Scenarios -- 5.4.Multiple Bonus Votes -- 5.5.Related Referendums -- 5.6.Conclusions -- 6.A Field Test of Storable Votes in Large Elections: Student Elections on the Columbia Campus -- 6.1.The Test -- 6.2.Estimating the Probable Impact of the Bonus Vote -- 6.3.Conclusions -- 7.Conclusions -- pt. 2 The Proofs -- 1.The Simple Logic of Storable Votes -- 1.1.The Formal Model -- Version 1 -- 1.2.Proof of Proposition 1.1 -- 1.3.Proof of Proposition 1.2 -- 1.4.Construction of the Figures in Chapter 1 -- 2.Storing Votes over Time -- 2.1.The Formal Model -- Version 2 -- 2.2.Proof of Proposition 2.1 -- 2.3.Proof of Proposition 2.2 -- 2.4.Proof of Proposition 2.3 -- 2.5.Three-proposal Games: The Second Election for the Two-voter Game -- 3.Protecting Minorities without Sacrificing Efficiency -- 3.1.The Formal Model -- Version 3 -- 3.2.Proof of Proposition 3.1 -- 3.3.Proof of Proposition 3.2 -- 3.4.Proof of Proposition 3.3 -- 3.5.Derivation and Discussion of Figure 3.1 -- 4.Agenda Control -- 4.1.The Formal Model -- Version 4.1 -- 4.2.Proof of Proposition 4.1 -- 4.3.Proof of Proposition 4.2 -- 4.4.Proof of Proposition 4.3 -- 4.5.Proof of Proposition 4.4 -- 4.6.Equilibria: Experiment 4.1 -- 4.7.The Formal Model -- Version 4.2 -- 4.8.Proof of Result 4.1 -- 4.9.Proof of Result 4.2 -- 4.10.Derivation of Table 4.5 -- 5.Storable Votes in Large Elections -- 5.1.The Formal Model -- Version 5 -- 5.2.Three Preliminary Results -- 5.3.Proof of Proposition 5.1 -- 5.4.Proof of Proposition 5.2 -- 5.5.Proof of Proposition 5.3 -- 5.6.Proof of Proposition 5.4 -- 6.A Field Test of Storable Votes in Large Elections: Student Elections on the Columbia Campus -- 6.1.Testing the Representativeness of the Samples -- 6.2.Measures of Inequality -- Appendix: Experimental Instructions -- A.1.Experiment in Chapter 1 -- A.2.Experiment in Chapter 2 -- A.3.Experiment in Chapter 3 -- A.4.Experiment 4.1 in Chapter 4 -- A.5.Experiment 4.2 in Chapter 4 -- A.6.Experiment in Chapter 6.
650		0	_aSeçimler _xMatematiksel modeller _986961
650		0	_aElections _xMathematical models _986962
650		0	_aOy verme _xMatematiksel modeller _986963
650		0	_aVoting _xMathematical models _986964
650		7	_aKarar verme _2etuturkob _911780
650		0	_aDecision making _92307
650		0	_aKarar verme _xMatematiksel modeller _929709
650		0	_aDecision making _xMathematical models _91155
942			_cBK